The Rationality of Free Will

In “The Absurdity of Free Will”, Hugo argues that we do not have free will, as conventionally understood. The basic premise is as follows:

1. The universe is either deterministic (can be calculated) or indeterministic (random)
2. If the universe is deterministic, then there’s no room for us to influence it
3. If the universe is indeterministic, then there’s still no room for us to influence it (there’s only random perturbations)
4. As there’s no room for us to influence the universe in either case, we do not have free will

At first glance, it seems we’re trapped – deterministic or indeterministic, the universe seems to leave no room for us! 

But wait a second – we aren’t trying to influence the universe from outside the system. We are a certain pattern of matter, not an ethereal soul. We are neural activity, we are action potentials, we are neurotransmitters. We are atoms, we are quarks. This recognition of the basis of our being is too often skipped over in discussions on free will. We must be careful to remember that even though consciousness, our sense of “I”, may “feel” like something outside the universe, outside the system of matter and energy, it is very much inside. With this modified view of ourselves, let’s take another look at Hugo’s points 2 and 3:

2. If the universe is deterministic, then we are deterministic. We can influence the universe, but only in deterministic ways.
3. If the universe is indeterministic, then we are indeterministic. We can influence the universe, but there’s some randomness associated with this influence.

This type of influence certainly seems more free! It also seems more aligned with our experience of the world – when I make a decision to buy a candy bar, I then buy the candy bar, without fail. My decision has influence on the universe, because my decision involves neural activity, which then drives other neural activity involved with making the purchase. 

However, there’s still the important question of whether this type of freedom is enough to label “free will”. After all, in the deterministic case, we’re still saying all our actions could be predicted (in theory, never in practice); and in the indeterministic case, we’re saying the only reason they couldn’t be predicted is due to random perturbations, not to us. It seems we don’t have an ability to have done otherwise in exactly the same scenario – I would always choose to buy the candy bar in the exact same state, with the exact same desires. Is this ability to “do otherwise” something most people look for in free will?

Overwhelmingly, it seems not (outside of philosophers). When talking about free will, people are looking for their conscious (and unconscious) decisions to be the determinant of their behavior (which we’ve just shown to be the case). They aren’t looking to be able to have made different decisions under exactly the same circumstances – in fact, the very notion of that is somewhat preposterous. If I decide to buy a candy bar, I do so because I weighed the options and drivers and landed on a purchase as the best path forward. Under other conditions, with different options and drivers, I may have landed on not purchasing as the best decision. There’s no freedom associated with having been able to make a different decision under exactly the same circumstances; only randomness! 

Philosophers seem to have become fixated on this idea of “could have done otherwise in exactly the same scenario” as a requirement of free will. There’s no sense in this conception – it leaves no room for a material self to be the decision-maker, and even an immaterial self can only fit it crudely. Very few people hope for this kind of free will. Instead, people have a more straightforward hope that their decisions are the driver of their actions. It would do the discipline well to transition focus to that conception – especially as it seems to be true.

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